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1. The need for institutional research 
Everyone agrees that technology is important for economic development. But so too are 
organisations and other institutions. Douglass North (1971, p. 120) wrote: 
The development of more efficient economic organisation is surely as important a part of the 
growth of the Western World as is the development of technology, and it is time it received equal 
attention. The few cases of which I am aware that have attempted to measure productivity change 
attributable to improving economic organisation certainly support this contention. 
Here, North underlined the view that institutions (including organisations) were just as vital 
as technology in driving or enabling growth, but they had been unfortunately neglected. He 
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went on to make several major contributions to our understanding of the role of institutions 
in economic history and economic development. He stimulated many others to contribute in 
the same vein and he won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his efforts. 
But despite North’s achievements, there is still a prominent view in some quarters that 
economic growth and development are largely about physical inputs and technology. Yet 
the “social technology” [as Nelson and Sampat (2001) have put it] of institutions is equally 
vital. We need to build the interdisciplinary field of institutional research, to further 
contribute to our understanding of institutions and their role in socio-economic activity. 
There is a useful precedent. Since the 1980s, there has been a remarkable global growth 
of research efforts in universities devoted to the new interdisciplinary field of innovation 
studies: it now sports its own institutes, academic positions, journals and degrees (Martin, 
2012). 
The massive success of innovation studies in attracting funding and researchers 
provides hope and inspiration for a new interdisciplinary field of institutional research. The 
case for the interdisciplinary study of institutions matches the case for the interdisciplinary 
study of technology. To understand economic institutions fully we need to draw from 
disciplines as diverse as sociology, politics, philosophy, law, history and psychology and 
economics itself. 
The interdisciplinary field of institutional research can appeal to the fact that 
institutional innovation is just as important as technological innovation, and the social 
technology of institutions is just as important as the technology of materials. This essay 
considers some of the fundamental concepts and research problems that this embryonic field 
uses and encounters. 
There are important debates about the definition of an institution, but a consensus is 
emerging that all institutions are systems of embedded social rules, even if that definition 
needs nuancing in some ways and some important controversies remain (Ostrom, 1990; 
Searle, 1995; Hindriks and Guala, 2015; Hodgson, 2006, 2015b, 2019; Guala, 2016). Such rules 
include laws, customs and established norms of behaviour. Consequently, systems of rules 
such as languages and codes of etiquette are institutions. Money is an institution because it 
entails shared rules concerning its value, function and exchangeability. 
Organisations such as states, banks, firms and universities, are systems of rules, and 
hence also institutions. North has been widely interpreted as denying that organisations are 
institutions, but in correspondence he denied this (Hodgson, 2006). Organisations are special 
institutions because they entail rules of membership and sovereignty. They are a sub-area of 
institutional analysis in their own right (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
Institutional studies would rightly prioritise the study of those institutions that impact 
upon the economy. Other institutions, such as language, are studied elsewhere (in 
linguistics). Demonstrations of the positive or negative effects on institutions on economic 
activity are important to gain public support and funding for this field of research. 
The basic definition of an institution as a system of established social rules raises a 
number of important questions that are central to institutional analysis. For instance, how 
are rules established in a community? Can some institutions arise spontaneously, or do some 
require some powerful authority? Why do people follow rules? Is rule-following a matter of 
habit or rational calculation? To what degree can rules be violated without endangering the 
survival of the institution? How do rules change? What happens when different rules 
prescribe conflicting or mutually incompatible actions? And so on. 
Posing these questions raises issues of power, psychology, politics, law and much else. 
Hence such research must draw upon multiple disciplines. The fact that economic 
institutions are uppermost does not, in particular, mean that the rational utility-maximiser 
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of mainstream economics has priority over other psycho-philosophical depictions or 
explanations of individual behaviour. Rather than the dogmatic application of one particular 
approach, it is a question of what theories are most useful and enlightening in their 
explanations of the institutional phenomena under study. 
Major contributions have already been made to the study of economic institutions by 
economists (both the original and new institutionalists), sociologists, political scientists, 
lawyers, philosophers and others. We need to combine these resources to develop 
institutional research. 
It is important to acknowledge that institutional research has already made major 
progress, notably for example in the area of economic development. For instance, the 
literature on “legal origins” claims to show that countries adopting an Anglo-American style 
system of common law during and after colonialisation have experienced stronger economic 
growth (La Porta et al., 1999, 2008). Daron Acemoglu et al. (2005) and his colleagues have 
proposed a different institutional theory. In North America, Australia and a few other 
places, the British colonisers made a deliberate attempt to set up legal and governmental 
institutions similar to those in their homeland. On the other hand, Britain and other 
European colonisers in Africa and South America, partly for reasons of disease in the 
tropical climate, were less inclined to build up European institutions. The colonisers 
focussed instead on the (often brutal) extraction of slaves and raw materials. According to 
Acemoglu et al. (2005), these different founding institutions largely explain subsequent 
divergences of economic performance. Although particular theories are controversial, there 
is now widespread recognition that institutions are major factors in helping to explain 
economic development. 
The following sections explore different aspects of institutional research. The discussion 
of individual motivation in section two shows the importance of psychology and philosophy 
in understanding individual motivations, particularly to follow or break institutional rules. 
The discussion of property rights and transaction costs in section three illustrates some 
of the severe difficulties that may arise when definitions of key terms are contested or 
unclear. The final section wraps up the essay by drawing together some prominent issues 
for the future. 
2. Institutions and individual motivation 
Mainstream economists often assume that the individual acts like a rational calculator, 
maximising his or her own utility (or satisfaction). By contrast, many leading institutional 
economists – including Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, Ronald Coase, Douglass North 
and Oliver Williamson – have emphasised that the individual has limited information and is 
often unable to appraise the optimal position. 
Important here is the idea of “bounded rationality” as developed by Herbert Simon (1957, 
1979). He argued that individual rationality is “bounded” because of limited information, or 
limited capacity to analyse highly-complex situations or problems. Among others, North 
and Williamson both emphasised bounded rationality. 
But in other respects there are big differences among institutional economists on how 
they understand individual motivation. Veblen (1899, 1914) emphasised habits. These are 
formed through repetition of action or thought. They are influenced by prior activity and 
have durable, self-sustaining qualities. A habit may exist even if it is not manifest in 
behaviour. Habits can be triggered by an appropriate stimulus or context. Habit is a 
propensity to behave in particular ways in a particular class of situations (Dewey, 1922; 
Camic, 1986; Ouellette and Wood, 1998; Wood et al., 2002). 
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The Veblenian concept of habit points to a crucial psychological mechanism by which 
institutions may affect individuals. Insofar as individuals are constrained or motivated to 
follow particular institutional norms or rules, then they tend to strengthen habits that are 
consistent with this behaviour. They may then rationalise these outcomes in terms of 
preference or choice (Hodgson, 2010; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004). According to this view, 
conscious choices are generally the outcome of habits, rather than the other way around. 
Unlike other economists who take individual preferences as given, North (1981, 1990, 
1994) delved increasingly into how ideologies and other cognitive factors can frame our 
thoughts and preferences, in specific institutional and cultural environments. He pointed to 
the limits of the standard rational-choice framework. He wrote: 
History demonstrates that ideas, ideologies, myths, dogmas and prejudices matter; and an 
understanding of the way they evolve is necessary [. . .]. Belief structures get transformed into 
societal and economic structures by institutions (North, 1994, pp. 362-363). 
The starting point of a given individual (with fixed and enduring tastes and preferences) is 
problematic. It could be a temporary explanatory simplification, but ultimately, we need to 
probe further. Individual choice requires a conceptual framework to make sense of the 
world. The reception of information by individuals requires cognitive norms and frames to 
process and make sense of that information. As the original institutionalists argued, the 
transmission of information from individual to individual is impossible without immersion 
in a common culture, in which the individual learns the meaning and value of the 
information that is communicated. 
There are also problems with the idea that we can explain institutions exclusively in terms 
of individuals. Even the most basic institutions involve human interaction, typically using 
some kind of language. Language itself is an institution (Searle, 1995; Hodgson, 2006). The 
communication of information itself requires shared conventions, rules, routines and norms. 
Consequently, any project to explain the emergence of institutions on the basis of given 
individuals runs into difficulties, particularly with regard to the conceptualisation of the 
initial state from which institutions are supposed to emerge (Aoki, 2001). 
While individual motivations and incentives are important, among institutional 
researchers there are differences in views on how they are understood or modelled, ranging 
to proponents of utility maximisation (where all behaviour explained in terms of attempts to 
increase utility or satisfaction) to those like Coase and North who adopted a more nuanced 
view of human nature (which addresses multiple factors, including moral motivation and 
possible altruism, as well as greed). To understand human motivation there is a strong case 
for bringing in insights from psychology, as institutionalists such as Veblen (1899, 1914) 
and North (1990) have argued. There is also a place for evolutionary ideas to help explain the 
nature of human motivation (Hodgson, 2013). 
Relatedly, Knight (1992) criticised some prominent institutionalist literature for 
neglecting the importance of distributional and power considerations in the emergence and 
development of institutions. Importantly, Ostrom (1990) emphasised the role of culture and 
norms in establishing and moulding both perceptions and behavioural interactions. Scott 
(1995) stressed the cognitive dimensions of institutions. 
The idea that institutions help constitute individual motivation and behaviour admits an 
enhanced concept of power into institutional analysis. Power is exercised not only by 
forceful coercion or constraint. For Lukes (1974) the overemphasis on the coercive aspect of 
power ignores the way that it is often exercised more subtly, particularly by customs and 
institutions. In this way, perceptions and preferences are altered. 
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Accordingly, to understand individual motivation and action more fully, institutional 
research should draw on these and other insights from multiple disciplines. 
3. Property rights, law and transaction costs 
The concept of property rights was stressed by original institutionalists such as Commons, 
as well as by more recent institutional researchers and those working on the “economics of 
property rights”. Property rights are seen as a vital component of the basic institutional 
structure of an economy with property ownership. But the concept of property rights has 
different definitions. 
Some prominent economists have defined property rights in terms of control of an asset 
rather than moral or legal entitlement (Alchian, 1977; Barzel, 1994). Such definitions have 
been criticised for mistaking de facto possession for legal property (Heinsohn and Steiger, 
2013; Hodgson, 2015a, 2015c, 2017). The upshot of the Alchian-Barzel definitions is that if a 
thief manages to keep stolen goods then he acquires a substantial property right to them, 
even if, on the contrary, legal or moral considerations would suggest that they remain the 
rightful property of their original owner. But it is misleading to describe the perceived 
ability to use or enjoy something as a “right”. Enjoyment or usage can occur without rights, 
and rights without usage or enjoyment. Possession is principally a relation between a person 
and a thing. It does not amount to legal ownership. Rights result from institutionalised rules 
involving assignments of benefit and duty (Honoré, 1961; Heinsohn and Steiger, 2013). 
In contrast to Alchian and Barzel, Commons and Coase stressed that property must 
entail legal ownership, and hence, the legal system plays an important role in establishing 
deemed rights. Commons (1924, p. 87) saw the contractual exchange of property as 
involving a minimum of not two parties but three, where the third is the state or a “superior 
authority”. Similarly, Coase (1959, p. 25) saw property rights as determined: 
[. . .] by the law of property [. . .]. One of the purposes of the legal system is to establish that clear 
delimitation of rights on the basis of which the transfer and recombination of rights can take 
place through the market. 
By these definitions, property is a historically specific rather than a universal phenomenon 
(Honoré, 1961; Hodgson, 2015a, 2015c). 
The role of law is still debated among institutional researchers. Some treat law 
principally as a cost or constraint for individuals, who are simply maximising their 
“economic” benefits (Barzel, 1989). Others point out to evidence that suggests that many 
people obey the law because they believe it is the right thing to do, not simply because they 
fear punishment (Tyler, 1990; Hodgson, 2015c). This raises the role of moral motivation, 
particularly when following accepted institutional rules (Smith, 1759; Sen, 1987; Hodgson, 
2013; Smith, 2013). 
Another important area of discussion is the role of law in constituting the modern firm 
and creating the possibility of corporate agency (Deakin et al., 2017; Gindis, 2016; Hodgson, 
2015a). A key question here is whether the corporation can be treated as an agent in itself, or 
must it be understood solely in terms of the human individuals that make up the 
organisation. Attention to legal aspects of the firm helps to answer questions concerning 
the nature and boundary of the firm. Hence it may help to restart progress in the theory of 
the firm, which has slowed down considerably since 1990. 
The concept of transaction costs was originally highlighted by Coase (1937, 1960) and 
developed further by Williamson (1975, 1985) and others. Transaction costs have been 
regarded the costs of formulating, negotiating, monitoring and enforcing transactions. 
Coase’s (1937) path-breaking argument was that firms exist when the costs of an alternative 
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market-like arrangement are greater than the costs of operating a firm. Instead of organising 
production by numerous contracts at every stage of the process, the firm greatly reduces the 
number and complexity of transactions by placing workers in employment contracts under 
a single authority. That is why firms exist. 
But there is an unresolved dispute between various definitions of transaction cost, which 
has important analytical consequences (Allen, 1991, 2015; Demsetz, 1968). Although the 
concept of transaction cost has been used by Williamson and others in extensive empirical 
work on contracts and organisational forms, the conceptual underpinnings are still debated. 
It is difficult to measure transaction costs directly. The many empirical attempts to test 
various forms of transaction cost analysis have brought mixed results (David and Han, 
2004; Carter and Hodgson, 2006). 
In clarifying and developing key concepts, institutional research needs to look at legal 
forms and to use insights from philosophy and elsewhere on how to refine and 
operationalise these categories. 
4. A future for institutional research 
Institutions are the stuff of socio-economic life. Accordingly, the study of the role of 
institutions in the economy is likely to remain a central topic in the social sciences. In 
developed economies, the question of institutional design is of major importance. It impacts 
government policy and is vital in the development of business organisations. We also need 
to understand better the ways in which economic, political, legal and customary institutions 
interact and contribute to economic development. 
If institutional research were to become more established as an interdisciplinary field of 
study, its agenda should address the following issues. First, there is the need to develop 
empirical databases to test institutional theories. Many of the successful recent pieces of 
research in institutional analysis have used empirical databases to test various propositions 
regarding the influence of different types of institution over economic performance. The 
development, refinement and use of empirical databases measuring institutional features 
will remain an important activity for institutional research. 
Second, many of the disputes and inconclusive arguments within institutional research 
entail different definitions or understandings of key concepts, such as institution, property 
or transaction cost. More effort should be devoted to conceptual clarification – recruiting 
insights from philosophy and social theory – to establish more of a consensus and common 
understanding concerning these core concepts. 
Third, institutional researchers need to build bridges between the disciplines involved. 
Many previous institutional researchers, including Veblen and North, emphasised the 
importance of delving into psychology, to obtain a deeper understanding of human 
motivation and of the reasons for following or breaking institutional rules. The importance 
of political science is widely recognised, and to a lesser extent sociology and anthropology. 
We should also follow Commons and others, in paying closer attention to the role of law in 
the economy. Last but not least, philosophy has also made a major recent contribution to our 
understanding of rules and institutions, and philosophy generally will remain important for 
institutional research. 
Fourth, institutional researchers, from Veblen to North, understood the importance of 
developing an understanding of the mechanisms of institutional change. This remains an 
important unfinished task on the agenda. Institutional research may be able to make further 
progress by bringing in insights from evolutionary theory and from the study of complexity. 
Fifth, the interaction between institutions and other factors, particularly technology, 
needs to be better understood. While some progress has been made in this area, there needs 
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to be more dialogue and cooperation between the study of technology and the study of 
institutions. We need to understand the similarities, differences and interactions between 
these two domains of evolution. 
Finally, the policy implications of institutional analysis need to be developed, 
particularly by gaining further insights concerning the nature and role of key institutions 
such as markets, property rights, corporations and the state. 
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